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Abstract:  
The new NYSE rules for corporate governance require the audit committee to 
discuss and review the firm’s risk assessment and hedging strategies. They also put 
additional requirements for the composition and the financial knowledge of the 
directors sitting on the board and on the audit committee. In this paper, we 
investigate whether these new rules as well as those set by the Sarbanes Oxley act 
lead to hedging decisions that are of more benefit to shareholders. We construct a 
novel hand collected dataset that allows us to explore multiple definitions for the 
financially knowledgeable term present in this new regulation. 
 
We find that the requirements on the audit committee size and independence are 
beneficial to shareholders, although maintaining a majority of unrelated directors in 
the board and a director with an accounting background on the audit committee may 
not be necessary. Interestingly, financially educated directors seem to encourage 
corporate hedging while financially active directors and those with an accounting 
background play no active role in such policy. This evidence combined with the 
positive relation we report between hedging and the firm’s performance suggests that 
shareholders are better off with financially educated directors on their boards and 
audit committees. Our empirical findings also show that having directors with a 
university education on the board is an important determinant of the hedging level. 
Indeed, our measure of risk management is found to be an increasing function of the 
percentage of directors holding a diploma superior to a bachelor degree. This result 
is the first direct evidence concerning the importance of university education for the 
board of directors. 
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1 
Introduction 
The recent corporate scandals reported in the press have outraged the financial community and have 
clearly revealed serious flaws in the US corporate governance system. Of course, the board of directors, 
considered as an important part in a corporate governance system, took the largest part of the blame 
and directors were accused of failure in their watchdog role. For example in the Enron’s case, the 
Powers1 report concluded that Enron’s board “failed to monitor …to safeguard Enron’s shareholders”. 
These scandals have served as catalysts for legislative and regulatory changes. New rules were adopted 
in order to prevent the recurrence of disasters similar to the Enron or WorldCom’s cases. In this 
context, the Sarbanes-Oxley act (SOX hereafter) enacted in 2002 tried to restore credibility to the US 
corporate governance system by setting stricter rules on the functioning and the independence of the 
external auditor, enabling the board of directors to acquire higher levels of fiduciary and statutory 
responsibilities and also by proposing new rules aimed to enhance the quality of financial disclosures 
by firms. More recently, the NYSE adopted a new set of rules designed to complement the SOX 
requirements in the matter of corporate governance2.  
Interestingly, the SOX does not set any particular requirements for the board as a whole entity, but does 
require that the audit committee should be entirely composed of independent directors and should count 
at least one financially knowledgeable member3. The new rules set by the NYSE define additional 
conditions concerning the independence of the board of directors and the composition of the audit, 
compensation and governance committees4 . Overall, this new regulation on corporate governance 
significantly focuses on the audit committee and the independence of the board of directors.  
                                                          
1 Report of investigation by the special investigation committee of the board of directors of Enron Corp, William C Powers 
Jr et al, 2002, at http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/enron/specinv020102rpt1.pdf 
2We are aware that other US exchanges such as the AMEX amended rules to regulate corporate governance in their listed 
firms but we decided to limit our discussion to the regulation set by the NYSE because it is considered as the largest US 
Stock Exchange and consequently there is more money at stake motivating the analysis of its requirements. Indeed, 
according to the WFE official figures, as of December 31st, 2004, the NYSE market capitalization for domestic listed 
companies (excluding closed-end funds) is 12.7 trillions USD compared to 0.08 trillions USD for the AMEX and 3.7 
trillions USD for the NASDAQ.   
3 Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley act requires that: “each member of the audit committee of the issuer shall be a member 
of the board of directors of the issuer, and shall otherwise be independent”. Section 407 requires that “the commission shall 
issue rules….to require each issuer, together with periodic reports… to disclose whether or not, and if not, the reasons 
therefore, the audit committee of that issuer is comprised of at least 1 member who is a financial expert”  
4 Section 303A.01 of the NYSE’s listed company manual requires that “listed companies must have a majority of 
independent directors”.  Section 303A.04 requires that “listed companies must have a nominating/ corporate governance 
committee composed entirely of independent directors” while Section 303A.05 requires that “listed companies must have a 
compensation committee composed entirely of independent directors”. Finally, Section 303A.07 requires that “the audit 
committee must have a minimum of three members. Each member of the audit committee must be financially literate; as 
such qualification is interpreted by the company’s board in its business judgment, or must become financially literate within 
a reasonable period of time after his or her appointment to the audit committee. In addition, at least one member of the 
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We are aware that stricter rules for the audit committee and the independence of the board will help 
prevent financial scandals and ensure a better monitoring, but we are tempted to ask whether the 
independence of the board as a whole entity is sufficient to solve all the problems related to the US 
corporate governance system5. Obviously, no director of any board wants to find itself at the heart of a 
scandal. So, perhaps the scandals we observed recently are not caused by directors who lack the 
incentive to monitor properly the firm’s management (the independence argument) but simply by 
directors who are unable to do so. Indeed, when the directors sitting on the board are generalists (even 
if they are totally independent) and lack the technical financial knowledge needed to understand the 
complicated reports and operations presented to them, they could unconsciously vote for resolutions 
that do not necessarily increase shareholders’ wealth. In the Enron’s case, the Powers report concludes 
that Enron’s board “should be faulted… for failing to probe and understand the information that did 
come to it”6. The lack of financial expertise for the board members was recently confirmed by Buckley 
and Van Der Nat (2003) who reported disturbing levels of ignorance among independent directors in 
the matter of derivatives policy.  
One might object that the lack of financial knowledge for directors is no longer a problem because the 
SOX and the new rules set by the NYSE do require the audit committee members to be financially 
knowledgeable. This statement would not hold for two reasons. First, the financial knowledge 
requirement applies only to the audit committee members, which will certainly lead to improved 
monitoring of the firm’s accounting statements but not necessarily to a board that takes optimal 
decisions from a shareholder perspective. We think that financial knowledge should not be exclusive to 
the directors sitting on the audit committee.  
Second, section 303A.07 of the NYSE’s listed company manual requires all members of the audit 
committee to be financially knowledgeable … or to become it in a reasonable period of time; and the 
definition of financially knowledgeable is left to the discretion of the board of directors. Even if a 
financially knowledgeable audit committee is sufficient to guarantee an effective monitoring from the 
board, this rule leaves too much room for interpretation. Section 303A.07 should provide a clearer 
                                                          
audit committee must have accounting or related financial management expertise, as the company’s board interprets such 
qualification in its business judgment”.  Unfortunately, the time consuming aspect of data collection oblige us to limit our 
discussion only to the requirements concerning the audit committee. 
5 We are considering problems other than accounting scandals which are supposed to be prevented by the regulation on the 
audit committee. 
6 Rosen (2003) reports comments made by professor William H Widden in which the latter states: “even though Enron was 
running a derivatives business, it seems that those on the finance committee and, more generally on the board, did not have 
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definition for the financially knowledgeable term. Likewise, the SOX definition of financial knowledge 
primarily focuses on whether the director has prior accounting related experience. Such definition is 
very restrictive and will limit the pool of qualified directors [Defond, Hann and Hu, 2004]. In this 
paper, we explore multiple definitions for a director who is financially knowledgeable: a director 
whose current or past activities/positions are related to finance (example: present or former CFO, an 
insurer; a financial analyst, a financial consultant, a banker, …etc), a director whose educational 
background includes financial literacy (MBA, BBA, B.Comm, ….) and finally a director with an 
accounting background (CA, CPA,…), in accordance with the SOX view.  
The purpose of this paper is to verify the importance of the financial knowledge and independence 
arguments imposed by the new regulation. More precisely we have the intent to assess the effect, on the 
firm’s hedging policy, of two requirements set by the SOX (audit committee entirely composed of 
independent members and at least one member considered as financially knowledgeable) and four 
requirements set by the NYSE (majority of independent directors on the board, audit committee with a 
minimum of three members, each member of the audit committee must be financially literate, and at 
least one member of the audit committee must have accounting knowledge). We decided to evaluate 
these rules by considering their possible impact on the risk management policy for three reasons.  
First, section 303.07 (D) of the NYSE’s listed company manual requires the audit committee “to 
discuss policies with respect to risk assessment and risk management”. Consequently, there is a great 
chance that the rules concerning the board or at least those concerning the audit committee affect 
corporate hedging. Indeed, because these entities are henceforth legally responsible of the risk 
management policy, the changes in their composition or the background of their members is likely to 
affect their decisions in this matter.  
Second, it is well documented in the literature that risk management is beneficial to the firm because it 
reduces its tax payments [Smith and Stulz, 1985], its financial distress costs [Stulz, 1984], its 
information asymmetry costs [Stulz, 1990; DeMarzo and Duffie, 1991; Breeden and Viswanathan, 
1998] and its financing costs [Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Morellec and Smith, 2002]. 
Accordingly, corporate hedging should improve the firm’s performance. Our empirical evidence 
confirms this hypothesis. Indeed, we find that more corporate hedging leads to an increase in the firm’s 
owners’ rate of return, as measured by the return on equity. This finding holds even when we use an 
                                                          
a sufficient derivatives background to understand and evaluate what they were being told in the presentation. If they had 
this background, the identified risk mitigants would not have been accepted”.    
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instrumental variable approach to control for the endogenous aspect of the hedging activity. 
Consequently, we can assert that every characteristic of the board (audit committee) that encourages 
the firm to increase its hedging ratio is beneficial to shareholders.  
Third, risk management implies dealing with derivatives and other financially sophisticated tools. 
Thus, considering the risk management decision makes it possible to test whether an independent 
board/audit committee is capable of taking complicated mandatory decisions that benefit shareholders, 
or whether we need to impose financial knowledge on the directors to achieve this goal.  
We contribute to the risk management literature by proposing a new set of explanatory variables that 
have never been explored before. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to establish a 
relationship between corporate hedging and the background and education of the board and the audit 
committee members. We also add to the literature on corporate governance by considering a broader 
definition for financial knowledge. Previous papers limit their analysis to directors engaged in financial 
activities and more precisely to those with a banking/insurance experience. We are the first to consider 
that directors could have a financial background thanks to their education. Our empirical evidence 
shows the importance of education for directors and suggests that only financially educated members of 
the board and audit committee affect corporate hedging.  
Our tests will shed light on the effectiveness of the new US corporate governance regulation but will 
also provide some references to make new recommendations and mainly to evaluate other corporate 
governance systems. This last point is very important in the present context because, as stated in 
Buckley and Van Der Nat (2003), the governance problem is not limited to a few rotten eggs in 
America.  
Our empirical findings suggest that the new rules on the audit committee size and independence incite 
firms to seek more hedging while the requirement of a majority of unrelated directors on the board has 
no effect on the risk management level. Likewise, directors engaged in financial activities and those 
with an accounting background play no active role in the hedging policy. Only the directors’ financial 
education affects such activity. Overall, our empirical findings show the importance of education, in 
general, and of financial education in particular, for directors sitting on the board and on the audit 
committee.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. Section I reviews the literature on the board and 
audit committee independence and financial knowledge. Section II contains our research design where 
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we describe our sample and variables. Section III and IV correspond respectively to the univariate and 
multivariate analysis. In section V we investigate the importance of university education for the 
directors sitting on the board and on the audit committee. Section VI reports the results of our 
investigation when the board and the audit committee characteristics are considered jointly. In section 
VII we test the effect of corporate hedging on the firm’s performance. Section VIII concludes the 
paper. 
 
I. Literature review 
A. The board of directors as a corporate governance mechanism 
A.1.The independence argument 
The board of directors plays a central role in any corporate governance system and is viewed as a 
primary means for shareholders to exercise control over top management [Kose and Senbet, 1998]. The 
standard approach in empirical finance and in modern corporate America is to view the board’s 
independence as closely related to its efficiency. Following the same reasoning, section 303A.01 of the 
NYSE’s listed companies manual requires a majority of independent directors on the board. Indeed, 
outside directors are viewed as superior monitors because their careers are not tied to the firm’s CEO 
and consequently they are free to take decisions that go against him without being afraid for their 
positions and future compensation. This view is often referred to as the monitoring effect theory. Also, 
outside directors have incentives to build reputations as expert monitors in order to obtain additional 
director appointments. Consequently, they are more likely to maintain proper control over the firm’s 
top management [Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983]. 
Several papers have reported evidence supporting the monitoring effect theory. Rosenstein and Wyatt 
(1990) show that the market has a significant positive reaction following the announcement of outsider 
board appointments in the Wall Street Journal while Weisbach’s evidence (1988) suggests that CEO 
turnover is more sensitive to performance in firms with outsider dominated boards than it is in firms 
whose boards are dominated by insider directors. Likewise, MacAvoy and Millstein (1999) find that 
board independence is positively correlated with accounting-based measures of firm performance while 
Cotter et al. (1997) show that targets whose boards contain a majority of outside directors receive 
higher returns than similar firms without such majority. Other papers that reported evidence supporting 
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the benefit of having outside directors on the board are Brickley et al. (1994) who find a statistically 
positive and significant market reaction following the adoption of a poison pill clause when the board is 
dominated by a majority of outside directors; Beasley (1996) and Dechow and Sloan (1996) who show 
that a higher level of outside directors on the board will decrease the likelihood of fraudulent 
information in the firm’s financial statements; and Klein (2002) who finds that companies with 
independent boards are less likely to manage their earnings by reporting abnormal accruals. 
Based on the above mentioned papers, there seems little room to doubt that the firm and its 
shareholders are better off with outside directors on their boards. Unfortunately, the empirical findings 
on the board’s independence are very mixed and a large part of the research has reported evidence 
against the monitoring effect theory. For example, Fosberg (1989) finds that firms with a large 
percentage of outside directors on their board do not have a higher performance as measured by the 
firm’s ROE or sales. The absence of relation between the firm’s performance and the independence of 
its board members has also been confirmed by Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Klein (1998), Bhagat 
and Black (2002) and more recently by Hayes, Mehran and Scott (2004). Other papers having reported 
evidence refuting the superior monitoring attributed to outside directors are Subrahmanyam et al. 
(1997) and Harford (2000) for the acquisition transactions, Core et al. (1999) for CEO compensation 
and Agrawal and Chadha (2005) for earnings restatements.  
Few papers have linked the board composition to the firm’s risk management activity and the reported 
findings seem to refuel the debate on the benefit of outside directors. Indeed, while Borokhovich et al. 
(2004) show that interest rate derivatives usage increases with the proportion of outside directors on the 
board, Dionne and Triki (2004) and Mardsen and Prevost (2005) report evidence suggesting that the 
presence of such directors has no effect on the firm’s risk management policy. Particularly, Mardsen 
and Prevost (2005) results indicate that the presence of outside directors on the board has no effect 
either on the decision to hedge or the extent of hedging. Whidbee and Wohar (1999) have also 
investigated the effect of the board’s independence on the decision to hedge with derivatives for a 
sample of bank holding companies. Their evidence suggests that the probability of using derivatives 
increases with outside membership on the board only when insiders hold large blocks of shares in the 
firm. 
Consequently, given the mixed empirical findings on the board’s independence, it is difficult to say 
whether or not firms are better off with outside directors on their boards. While Fields and Keys (2003) 
claim that there is overwhelming support for outside directors providing superior monitoring and 
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advisory functions to the firm, we could not predict a unique and clear sign for the effect of the new 
rules set by the NYSE, concerning the board’s independence, on any specific decision made by the firm 
including the risk management one.  
A.2. The benefit of financial knowledge for the board 
Although a tremendous amount of papers studied the effect of the board’s independence, little research 
has been done on the value of the board’s financial knowledge. The debate on this topic started with 
official reports such as the California Public Employees’ Retirement System Corporate Governance 
Market Principles (CalPERS) issued in 1997 and the National Association of Corporate Directors 
(NACD) Blue Ribbon Commission Report issued in 1998. At the time, both reports recognized the 
importance of the board’s independence but also recommended financial literacy/expertise for directors 
given their important function in monitoring the firm’s performance. The new regulation provided by 
the SOX and the NYSE rules do not require financial knowledge for the board as a whole entity but 
only for its members who sit on the audit committee. 
The few papers having investigated the financial knowledge argument for board members do support 
the idea that financial directors add value to the firm. Indeed, Booth and Deli (1999) and more recently 
Guner, Malmendier and Tate (2004) report a positive relation between the presence of a commercial 
banker in the board and the firm’s debt level7. Their findings suggest that commercial bankers provide 
the financial expertise needed to enable the firm to contract more debt. Also, Rosenstein and Wyatt 
(1990) find that the positive abnormal returns associated with the addition of an outsider to the board 
are higher when the latter is an officer of a financial firm. This result has subsequently been confirmed 
by Lee, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1999). They were however unable to report any statistically significant 
difference in reaction among the three categories of financial outside directors they consider: 
commercial bankers, insurance company officers and investment bankers. More recently, Agrawal and 
Chadha (2005) have reported evidence supporting the benefit of having outside financial directors on 
the board. They find that the probability of earnings restatement is lower in firms whose boards have an 
independent director with a background in accounting or finance. The independence argument taken 
alone seems to have no explanatory power in their case.  
                                                          
7 Guner, Malmendier and Tate (2004) show that bigger corporate loans go mostly to firms with good credit quality and they 
use this finding to conclude that commercial bankers do not act in the interest of shareholders but rather in the interest of 
credit holders.   
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The literature on the board’s financial knowledge has focused mainly on the earnings management 
problem. To the best of our knowledge, no paper has ever investigated the impact of the board’s 
financial knowledge on the risk management policy8. Our paper is the first to establish such link. To 
the extent that financially knowledgeable directors have a better understanding of the sophisticated 
financial tools involved in the risk management transactions, we expect firms whose boards count 
financially knowledgeable directors to engage more actively in risk management. 
B. The role of the audit committee 
The primary task of the audit committee is to oversee the firm’s financial performance and ensure the 
reliability of its financial reporting. Periodic review of the firm’s risk assessment system and the 
managerial actions used to manage its risks is a critical step toward fulfilling this task. The new rules 
set by the SOX require the presence of at least one financially knowledgeable director on the audit 
committee and the independence of all its members while the NYSE listed company manual requires 
that all members of the audit committee be independent and financially knowledgeable. The NYSE 
also requires that at least one member of the audit committee must have accounting knowledge. We 
would expect audit committees with such characteristics to provide effective monitoring because they 
are free of any influence from the firm’s CEO and possess the financial background needed to 
understand what is going on in the firm. A large body of academic literature has investigated the extent 
to which audit committee independence and financial literacy/expertise are beneficial to shareholders.  
The reported empirical evidence supports the argument that financially knowledgeable audit 
committees are beneficial to the firm. Indeed, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) show that the probability of 
earnings restatement is lower in firms whose audit committees have an independent director with a 
background in accounting or finance while Abbott, Parker and Peters (2002) find that the absence of a 
financial expert on the audit committee is significantly associated with an increased probability of 
financial misstatement and financial fraud. Furthermore, Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt (2003) show that 
the presence of investment bankers on the audit committee is associated with lower discretionary 
accruals in the firm and, Defond, Hann and Hu (2004) and Davidson et al. (2004) report a positive 
market response to the addition of a financial expert to the audit committee. Both papers find that the 
reaction is primarily driven by the appointment of directors with auditing/ accounting experience.  
                                                          
8 Borokhovich et al (2004) include a dummy variable indicating the presence of a bank executive in the board in their test of 
corporate hedging theories. However, this variable is aimed to control for the firm’s access to financing by banks.  
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The benefit of having independent directors on the audit committee is however still the subject of much 
debate because of the conflicting results reported in the literature. Indeed, Hayes, Mehran and Scott 
(2004) show that the firm’s performance measured by the market to book ratio is unrelated to the 
fraction of outside directors serving on the audit committee and Beasley (1996) finds that the presence 
of an audit committee and its composition do not affect the likelihood of financial statement fraud. 
Likewise, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) report evidence indicating that the independence of the audit 
committee members has no effect on the probability of earnings restatement. These empirical findings 
suggest that the independence of the audit committee members provides no superior benefit to the firm. 
However, Klein (2002) shows that firms with independent audit committees are less likely to manage 
their earnings by reporting abnormal accruals than firms with insider-dominated audit committees. 
Moreover, Abbott, Parker and Peters (2002) find that the presence of audit committees comprised 
entirely of independent directors decreases the likelihood of both financial misstatement and financial 
fraud, whereas Carcello and Neal (2000) report an inverse relation between the likelihood of receiving 
a going-concern report and the percentage of affiliated directors sitting on the audit committee. 
To the best of our knowledge no paper has ever tried to establish a relation between the composition of 
the audit committee, the background of its members, and corporate hedging. Our paper is the first to 
establish such link. Given the conflicting empirical evidence reported for the independence argument, 
we offer no directional expectations about the effect, on the firm’s risk management activity, of the 
new rules set by the SOX and the NYSE concerning the audit committee independence. Likewise, 
because audit committee members with financial backgrounds have the experience and training to 
understand the risk management operations, we expect firms with at least one financially 
knowledgeable director on their audit committees and those whose audit committees is entirely 
composed of financially knowledgeable directors to engage more actively in risk management. 
Furthermore, in addition to imposing the presence of independent and financially knowledgeable 
directors on the audit committee, the NYSE’s listed company manual requires that the audit committee 
be composed of at least three members. This rule is likely motivated by the desire to encourage firms to 
devote significant director resources to their audit committees. Indeed, audit committees with more 
members should be able to monitor the firm’s management more efficiently. However, communication 
between members might become more difficult in large audit committees which could deteriorate the 
quality of monitoring. Therefore, to the extent that the increase in the audit committee’s size does not 
hinder communication among its members, we expect firms complying with this requirement to report 
a higher hedging ratio. 
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II. Research design 
A. The sample 
A.1.Sample construction procedure 
In order to conduct our tests, we need quarterly observations on the composition of the board and audit 
committee and on the background of their members. Unfortunately, this information is published on an 
annual base in the firm’s proxy statement. Therefore, we suppose that the firm’s corporate governance 
characteristics will remain constant between two consecutive general annual meetings. We believe this 
assumption is reasonable since directors are usually elected, for at least a one year term, at the general 
annual meeting.  
We first check the fiscal year end for each firm in the sample during the period considered. Next, we 
match the general annual meeting date with the closest fiscal quarter end in order to determine in what 
fiscal quarter the meeting occurred. For example if the firm’s fiscal year end for 1997 is December 31st, 
and the general annual meeting is held on May 28th, 1997, we suppose that the general annual meeting 
is held in the second quarter of fiscal year 1997. Then, we collect data on the corporate governance 
characteristics of the firm. To avoid endogeneity problems, all our independent variables are measured 
one quarter prior to the one in which the hedge ratio is observed. Therefore, we use the corporate 
governance data collected from a proxy statement for all the risk management observations following 
the quarter in which the general annual meeting is held and we stop at the quarter in which the next 
annual general meeting occurs. Using the example mentioned above, if we suppose that the 1998 
general annual meeting is held in the second quarter of 1998, the corporate governance data collected 
from the 1997 proxy statement is used for the third and fourth quarters of 1997 and the first and second 
quarters of 1998. Figure 1 summarizes the procedure used to construct our sample. 
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Figure 1: Sample constitution procedure 
A.2. Data 
Data on the firm’s risk management activities, leverage, the convexity-based tax advantage of hedging, 
the investment opportunities and the firm’s home country comes from Dionne and Triki (2004). The 
initial sample covers the period running from January 1993 to December 1999 and corresponds to a 
panel dataset of 485 observations relative to 36 North American gold mining firms. We collect from 
proxy statements information concerning the board and the audit committee sizes, the name of each 
director sitting on the board and on the audit committee, their education, current and former functions, 
as well as information concerning the age of the CEO, the number of common shares and the value of 
options he holds9. Institutional shareholding is obtained from the 13-F and 13-G forms available on the 
SEC website, and from the proxy statements. 
We categorize directors as unrelated if they are independent of the firm’s management and free from 
any interest or relationship that could conceivably affect their ability to act in the best interests of the 
                                                          
9 Information from the proxy statements concerning the age of the CEO was available only for few Canadian firms because 
the publication of such information is not mandatory under Canadian law. Also, during our sample period there were only 
few details concerning the activities of the directors sitting on the board especially for Canadian firms and practically no 
information concerning the directors’ education for the whole sample.   
1998 Annual 
general meeting 
Audit and board characteristics are 
supposed to be constant over this period 
Corporate governance variables observed 
on the 1997 annual general meeting will 
be used as independent variables for 
these risk management observations 
 1997 Annual 
general meeting 
Q1   Q2       Q3  Q4       Q1  Q2       Q3  
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firm, other than interests arising from shareholdings. We eliminate current or former employees of the 
firm or of a related entity, directors who are employees, partners or owners of companies that have 
provided some service to or received some form of compensation from the sample firm during the 
fiscal year. In order to achieve this classification we search (1) the biographical background of D&O, 
(2) the directors’ compensation and (3) certain relationships and related transactions sections available 
in the proxy statements as well as biographical information available in the data sources listed in 
Appendix1. 
We also search these same data sources for information to determine whether the director has a current 
or former activity related to finance. A director is defined as financially active if he is presently or was 
formerly a CFO, treasurer, officer of an insurance or investment company, or of a mutual fund; a 
financial analyst, a financial consultant, a banker, ….or if he holds or formerly held any position related 
to finance. Moreover, we search the data sources for information concerning the directors’ education 
because this information is available only for few firms through proxy statements. Our search of the 
proxy statements and the different sources listed in Appendix 1 yields data on the education of almost 
70% of the 387 directors in our sample (corresponding to the initial 485 observations obtained from 
Dionne and Triki (2004)). In order to complete our dataset, we send an information request asking for 
details about the degrees held by the directors and their specialty to (1) the directors themselves, (2) the 
firms in our sample for which they have been or still are directors10, (3) other firms where they have 
served or still serve as directors. Data collection using the questionnaire was very difficult because 
many of the directors in our sample are retired now (some are even dead) and consequently, neither 
they nor the firms in which they were directors are obliged to disclose information about them. 
The data on education is also used to categorize directors as being financially educated or not. A 
director is classified as financially educated if he holds a degree or was enrolled in a program offering 
finance courses (BBA, MBA, Chartered accountant designation, Bachelor in commerce…..). Several 
directors in our sample enrolled in professional programs such as the Harvard Advanced Management 
Program (AMP) and the Program for Management Development (PMD) or the Stanford Executive 
Program. After checking the list of courses offered by these programs, we categorize these directors as 
financially educated. Finally, the information on education and activity is explored to determine 
whether the director has an accounting background. A director is said to have an accounting 
                                                          
10 In some cases, these firms had filed for bankruptcy and we were unable to contact them.  Also, some firms in our sample 
were acquired or merged. In this case we contacted the entity remaining in place after the transaction. 
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background if he is a chartered accountant (CA, CPA), or have an education or activity related to 
accounting. 
We were able to collect complete information about the directors’ education for 324 observations. For 
the remaining variables our sample corresponds to 347 observations relative to 36 firms: 11 US and 25 
Canadian. 
B. Variables definition 
B.1. The dependent variable 
The firm’s risk management activity is measured by the delta percentage (Delta%) defined as the delta 
of the risk management portfolio held by the firm divided by its expected production11. The Delta% is 
measured at the quarter end.  
B.2. Test variables 
We are evaluating the impact of the board and audit committee independence and financial knowledge 
on corporate hedging. To be consistent with the SOX requirements, we code the following variables: 
• Tot_ind_aud: is a dummy equal “1” if the audit committee is entirely composed of unrelated 
directors, “0” otherwise. 
• OnefinAct_aud: is a dummy equal “1” if at least one member of the audit committee is 
financially active, “0” otherwise. 
• OnefinEdu_aud: is a dummy equal “1” if at least one member of the audit committee is 
financially educated, “0” otherwise. 
• OneAcc_aud: is a dummy equal “1” if at least one member of the audit committee has an 
accounting background, “0” otherwise.  
The three last variables correspond to the different definitions we propose for financial knowledge. The 
last one describes also the NYSE requirement concerning the presence of at least one director with an 
accounting background on the audit committee. 
To be consistent with the NYSE requirements, we code these additional variables: 
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• Maj_unr_board: is a dummy equal “1” if the board has a majority of unrelated directors, “0” 
otherwise. As in Dechow et al. (1996), we use a cut-off rule of 50% to define the board’s 
majority.  
• Minsize_aud: is a dummy equal “1” if the audit committee has at least three members, “0” 
otherwise.  
• AllfinAct_aud: is a dummy equal “1” if all the directors sitting on the audit committee are 
financially active, “0” otherwise. 
• AllfinEdu_aud: is a dummy equal “1” if all the directors sitting on the audit committee are 
financially educated, “0” otherwise 
• %Acc_aud: is the proportion of directors with an accounting background sitting on the audit 
committee. Because no firm in our sample has an audit committee entirely composed of 
directors with an accounting background we were unable to construct a variable that measures 
the effect of having only accountants on this committee. We believe that %Acc_aud is a good 
alternative that will capture the benefit, if there is any, of having accountants on the audit 
committee.  
Also, because we are interested in evaluating the effect of financial knowledge and independence for 
board members that do not sit necessarily on the audit committee, we code the following variables: 
• %unr_board: is the proportion of unrelated directors on the board. It is calculated by dividing 
the number of unrelated directors by the board’s size. This variable allows us to investigate 
further the relation between the board’s independence and the risk management level in the 
firm. 
• MajfinAct_board (MajfinEdu_board): is a dummy variable equal “1” if the majority of the 
directors sitting on the board are financially active (educated), “0” otherwise. Initially, we 
wanted to investigate the effect of extending the NYSE rules concerning financial knowledge to 
all the board members. However, we realized that such rule is unlikely to be implemented in 
practice because it ignores the benefit of having a board with a diversified background. It is true 
that financial knowledge is important but it is not the only valuable skill needed to manage a 
                                                          
11 For more details concerning the definition and calculation of the delta percentage please refer to Tufano (1996). 
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firm. Therefore, we consider the alternative rule of having a majority of financially 
knowledgeable members on the board.  
• %Acc_board: is the proportion of directors with an accounting background sitting on the board. 
It is calculated by dividing the number of directors with an accounting background by the 
board’s size. Because no firm in our sample has a board with a majority of directors with an 
accounting background, we could not code a variable similar to MajfinAct_board and 
MajfinEdu_board for this definition of financial knowledge.  
• OneAcc_board: is a dummy equal “1” if at least one member of the board has an accounting 
background, “0” otherwise. Unfortunately, all the firms in our sample have at least one director 
on their board that is financially active (educated). Therefore, we could not test empirically the 
effect of having at least one director with such skills on the board. However, inferences could 
be drawn from the audit committee’s results because such firms do verify this condition. 
B.3. Control variables 
Several papers argue that whether information asymmetry concerns the cash flows generated from 
managerial investment decisions [Stulz, 1990], the firm’s dividend stream [DeMarzo and Duffie, 
1991], managerial quality [Breeden and Viswanathan, 1998] or the magnitude and characteristics of the 
risks the firm faces [DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995]; the more important it is, the more attractive would be 
risk management because it reduces the costs associated with such asymmetry. As in Graham and 
Rogers (2002) we use the percentage of shares held by institutions (%inst) as a proxy for information 
asymmetry. We also control for the convexity-based tax advantage of hedging [Smith and Stulz, 1985] 
by including a variable (taxsave) constructed with a modified version of the simulation approach 
proposed by Graham and Smith (1999)12. We expect firms to hedge more extensively when they have a 
greater fiscal advantage in doing so. 
Moreover, prior research finds that managerial risk aversion is an important determinant of the risk 
management policy in the gold mining industry [Tufano, 1996; Pertersen and Thiagarajan, 2000]. We 
use three variables to proxy managerial risk aversion: the number of the firm’s common shares held by 
the CEO (CEO_CS), the value of options held by the CEO (ValCEO_op) and the CEO age (CEO_age). 
The two first variables capture the Smith and Stulz (1985) argument that compensation packages 
                                                          
12 For a detailed description of this procedure and the modifications introduced, please refer respectively to Graham and 
Smith (1999) and Dionne and Triki (2004).  
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leading to a concave (convex) function between the managers’ expected utility and the firm’s value 
encourage managers to hedge more (less)13. CEO_age is expected to be negatively related to corporate 
hedging because older CEOs have a smaller fraction of their revenues and human capital tied to the 
firm’s value and therefore are less risk averse. However, Tufano (1996) argues that older CEOs facing 
imminent retirement might prefer reducing fluctuations in the firm’s value and hence hedge more 
extensively. Recall also that the CEO age could proxy its experience.  
Additionally, we control for the firm’s financial distress costs because they are considered as an 
incentive for firms to increase their hedging ratio. Our proxy for the firm’s financial distress costs is 
leverage (Leverage) measured as the book value of the long-term debt divided by the firm’s market 
value. Likewise, we control for the firm’s investment opportunities. Firms with attractive investment 
opportunities should hedge more extensively in order to ensure the availability of internally generated 
funds aimed to undertake these investments [Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Morellec and Smith, 
2002]. Our proxy for the firm’s investment opportunities is (Explo), the firm’s exploration expenditures 
scaled by its market value. Finally, we control for the firm’s home country by including a dummy 
variable equal “1” if the firm is US, “0” otherwise (Dum_US) because our sample includes both US and 
Canadian firms.  
 
III. Univariate analysis 
Table I reports the descriptive statistics for our test and control variables. Firms in our sample seem to 
pay attention to the independence of their boards and in a lesser extent to the independence of their 
audit committees. Indeed, the mean proportion of unrelated directors on the board is 61.3% and 76.1% 
of the firms in our sample have a board with a majority of unrelated directors while only 51.9% of the 
firms have an audit committee entirely composed of unrelated directors. Also, all the firms in our 
sample have at least one director who is financially educated (active) on their board while the mean 
proportion of firms with at least one accountant is 70%. Likewise, the mean proportion of firms with at 
least one financially educated (active) director on their audit committee is almost 88% while it is only 
47.3% for directors who are accountants. Overall, these results suggest that having at least one 
financially knowledgeable director on the board and audit committee is a common practice. Finally, 
                                                          
13 We decided to focus on the CEO holdings because (1) variables based on D&O holdings mix the incentive of different 
agents with different motives and (2) the CEO has the ultimate authority over an important decision like corporate hedging. 
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over 90% of the firms in our sample have an audit committee with at least three members suggesting 
that the new regulation on the audit committee size will probably not represent a constraint for firms 
because they already, to a large extent, meet with this requirement. 
(Insert Table I here) 
In Table II, we break down the sample into two groups according to the hedging ratio reported by the 
firm. The first group has a low level of risk management (Delta% less or equal to 50%) and the second 
group has a high level of risk management (Delta% strictly superior to 50%). Table II reports 
descriptive statistics for both groups as well as results corresponding to a t-test of the differences in the 
means (column 3) and to a non parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (column 6). 
According to the results reported in Panel B and C, the mean proportion of firms whose board contains 
at least one director with an accounting background is greater for the high risk management group 
(84.9% compared to 66.8% and the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level) and the 
presence of directors with an accounting background on the audit committee seems to reduce corporate 
hedging. This finding suggests that the presence of directors with an accounting background could have 
opposite effects on the hedging ratio depending on where they sit. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that the presence of unrelated directors on the board reduces corporate 
hedging. Indeed, the mean and median proportion of unrelated directors are higher for the low risk 
management group (the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level). However, the non 
significance of Maj_unr_board does not support the hypothesised negative relation between hedging 
the board’s independence. 
The results reported in Panel C also show that all the firms in the high risk management group have an 
audit committee composed of at least three members, whereas the mean proportion of firms meeting 
this standard for the low risk management group is 89.4% (the difference is statistically significant at 
the 1% level for both tests). This finding suggests that the NYSE requirement on the audit size should 
lead to an increase in the firm’s hedging ratio. Additionally, the mean proportion of firms whose audit 
committee is entirely composed of financially active directors is more important for the low risk 
management group (9.5% compared to 1.4% and the difference is statistically significant at the 1% 
level) which suggests that financially active directors discourage corporate hedging. However, the non 
significance of OnefinAct_aud does not support this hypothesis. Finally, the results reported in panel C 
concerning the director’s education are very similar to the ones reported for the whole board in panel B 
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and show that highly educated directors encourage risk management while those holding only a 
bachelor degree discourage corporate hedging. 
Overall, the univariate tests reported in Table II suggest that board independence and the education of 
the directors sitting on the board and on the audit committee is an important determinant of the hedging 
extent. The presence of directors with an accounting background seems also to affect this activity but 
the net effect is not clear. Given the multivariate aspect of the firm’s characteristics, these univariate 
tests should be interpreted with caution. Thus, multivariate analysis is necessary and will be the subject 
of the next section. 
(Insert Table II here) 
 
IV. Multivariate analysis 
In this section, we use multivariate analysis to examine the effect of the board/ audit committee 
independence and financial knowledge on the corporate hedging policy. We use a Tobit model to run 
our regressions in order to account for the censoring of our dependent variable (Delta%). Also, because 
our sample corresponds to a panel dataset, we had to choose between a random effect and a fixed effect 
specification. Greene (2004) shows that the incidental parameters problem affecting the fixed effect 
specification does not lead to biased estimates of the slope in the case of a Tobit model, but does cause 
a downward bias in the estimated standard deviations. Such a problem might lead to erroneous 
conclusions concerning the statistical significance of the variables used in the regressions. Accordingly, 
we opted for the random effect specification.  
For the audit committee, our empirical tests are based on the following model: 
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For the board of directors, our empirical tests are based on the following model: 
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Where Indaud (Indbor) and Finaud (Finbor) correspond, respectively, to the different variables 
described in the previous section we use as proxies for the audit committee (board of directors) 
independence and financial knowledge.  
Results in Table III correspond to our first definition of financial knowledge, i.e. financial activity. 
Panel A reports the results for the audit committee. Unlike Klein (2002), we find that the total 
independence of the audit committee is beneficial to the firm. Indeed, Tot_ind_aud has a positive and 
significant coefficient (at the 1% level) suggesting that an audit committee entirely composed of 
unrelated directors will encourage the firm to seek more hedging. However, the financial activity of the 
audit committee members is an irrelevant determinant of the hedging policy (OnefinAct_aud and 
AllfinAct_aud have insignificant coefficients). This result contradicts the findings of previous papers 
supporting the benefit of financially active directors on the audit committee [Abbott, Parker and Peters, 
2002; Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt, 2003; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005]. In Models 3 and 4, we interact 
the independence and financial activity variables. The results suggests that audit committee 
independence increases the firm’s risk management level, and this increase is greater when there is at 
least one financially active director on this committee but not when all the members of the committee 
are financially active. Our findings also confirm the conclusion we draw from the univariate analysis 
concerning the effect of having at least three members on the audit committee. Minsize_aud has a 
positive and significant coefficient (at the 1% in models 1 and 3 and at the 5% level in models 2 and 4) 
indicating that the NYSE requirement on the audit committee size will probably lead firms to seek 
more hedging.  
Panel B reports the results for the entire board of directors. According to our findings, having a 
majority of directors who are independent or financially active has no effect on the firm’s risk 
management activity (Maj_unr_board and MajfinAct_board have insignificant coefficients). However, 
the positive and significant (at the 1% level) coefficient reported for %unr_board suggests that the 
presence of unrelated directors on the board increases the hedging ratio but that the marginal benefit is 
limited because it disappears once the number of these directors becomes important compared to the 
board’s size. This conclusion does not support the intentions of the new guidelines promulgated by the 
NYSE. The results reported for model 3 in panel B also show that the benefit of having unrelated 
directors on the board is not affected by the presence of a majority of financially active directors. 
Finally, the coefficients reported for our control variables suggest that firms hedge in order to satisfy 
managerial risk aversion and to increase their value through a reduction of their financial distress and 
information asymmetry costs (Leverage (%inst) have a positive (negative) and significant coefficient at 
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the 1% level), and through a higher convexity tax advantage of hedging (Taxsave has a positive and 
significant coefficient at the 1% level). 
(Insert Table III here) 
Table IV reports the results for our second definition of financial knowledge, i.e. financial education. 
Panel A reports the results for the audit committee while Panel B reports the results for the entire 
board. Our conclusions concerning the benefit of having an audit committee entirely composed of 
unrelated directors and an audit committee composed of at least three members remain unchanged. 
Interestingly, Delta% is positively associated with directors’ financial education which confirms that 
directors will act in the interest of shareholders when they have the financial background to understand 
the decisions they are taking. Indeed, firms whose audit committee is entirely composed of financially 
educated directors and those whose board has a majority of financially educated directors are more 
active in managing their risks (AllfinEdu_aud and MajfinEdu_board have a positive and significant 
coefficient at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively). However, the presence of only one financially 
educated director on the audit committee is insufficient to affect the risk management policy 
(OnefinEdu_aud has an insignificant coefficient). The two variables proxying the board’s 
independence, %unr_board and Maj_unr_board, have positive and significant coefficients (at the 1% 
level) indicating that independent boards encourage firms to seek more hedging. Furthermore, the 
different interaction variables we use in models 3 and 4 reported in panel A and model 3 reported in 
Panel B have positive and significant coefficients (Tot_ind_aud x OnefinEdu_aud and Tot_ind_aud x 
AllfinEdu_aud coefficients are significant at the 1% level and %unr_board x MajfinEdu_board 
coefficient is significant at the 10% level) suggesting that the benefit of independence increase when 
combined with financial education. This result confirms the importance of financial education for the 
board and the audit committee members. 
Overall, our findings show the benefit of having financially literate directors not only on the audit 
committee, as required by the NYSE new rules, but also on the other committees of the board. It also 
provides support for the majority of unrelated directors’ requirement set by the NYSE. Finally, gold 
mining firms seem to hedge in order to increase their value and decrease their managerial risk aversion. 
(Insert Table IV here) 
Table V reports the results for our third definition of financial knowledge, i.e. accounting background. 
Panel A shows that, as for the two previous definitions considered, the presence of an audit committee 
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entirely composed of unrelated directors and with at least three members will increase the firm’s risk 
management activity. However, the presence of directors with an accounting background on the audit 
committee does not affect the risk management policy (OneAcc_aud and %Acc_aud have insignificant 
coefficients). This conclusion does not support the definition of financial knowledge provided by the 
SOX nor the findings of Defond, Hann and Hu (2004) and Davidson et al. (2004). More importantly, 
this result suggests that the NYSE rule requiring at least one director with an accounting background is 
not necessarily of benefit to shareholders. Interestingly, the interaction variables in models 3 and 4 
reported in Panel A have positive and significant coefficients (at the 1% level) indicating that the 
benefit of an audit committee entirely composed of independent directors increases when there are 
directors with an accounting background on it. 
Panel B of Table V reports the results for the entire board. We measure the board’s independence by 
two variables: Maj_unr_board and %unr_board. The presence of at least one director with an 
accounting background on the board (One_Acc_board) and the percentage of directors with such skills 
(%Acc_board) are insignificantly related to the Delta%. Also, the presence of unrelated directors on the 
board seems to encourage corporate hedging but the benefit of such directors is limited. Indeed, while 
%unr_board has a positive and significant coefficient (at the 1% level), Maj_unr_board has an 
insignificant one. The interaction variables we use in models 5 and 6 reported in panel B have 
insignificant coefficients also suggesting that the presence of directors with an accounting background 
on the board does not amplify the benefit of having unrelated directors in this entity. Finally, our 
conclusions concerning the other determinants of the risk management policy remain unchanged. 
(Insert Table V here) 
The results from the multivariate analysis show that the requirements concerning the audit committee’s 
size and independence are beneficial to shareholders because they incite the firm to increase its risk 
management activities. Moreover, the benefit of having an audit committee entirely composed of 
unrelated directors increases when it is combined with the presence of financially educated directors or 
directors with an accounting background on it. Little support is provided for the NYSE rule requiring a 
majority of unrelated directors on the board and the presence of at least one director with an accounting 
background. Interestingly, only the directors’ financial education is shown to affect the firm’s risk 
management activity. This result implies that the SEC should probably provide a narrower definition of 
the financially knowledgeable term, one that is closer to the notion of financial education. Finally, 
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consistent with Tufano (1996), our evidence suggests that the CEO’s age has no effect on the firm’s 
risk management activity. 
 
V. The importance of education for directors 
Results from the previous section show that the directors’ financial education is an important 
determinant of the hedging ratio. This finding indicates that, when the directors have the skills required 
to understand the different operations involved in the risk management policy, they will make decisions 
that are optimal from the shareholders perspective. This result leaves us wondering whether we need to 
require a minimum of education on the directors sitting on the board in order to ensure more efficient 
corporate decision-making. Of course, we are not saying here that directors without a university degree 
are not capable of doing a good job but we all know that a college degree does guarantee a minimum 
level of knowledge. In this section, we investigate the effect of the directors’ education on the risk 
management activity. To conduct our tests we code the following variables: 
• %ba_board: is the proportion of directors holding a bachelor degree on the board. It is 
calculated by dividing the number of directors holding such a degree by the board’s size. 
• %supba_board: is the proportion of directors holding a degree higher than a bachelor on the 
board. It is calculated by dividing the number of directors holding a degree higher than a 
bachelor (M.Sc, MBA, graduate degree, doctorate, etc) by the board’s size.  
• %ba_aud: is the proportion of directors holding a bachelor degree on the audit committee. It is 
calculated by dividing the number of directors holding only a bachelor by the audit committee’s 
size. 
• %supba_aud: is the proportion of directors holding a degree higher than a bachelor on the audit 
committee. It is calculated by dividing the number of directors holding a degree higher than a 
bachelor (M.Sc, MBA, graduate degree, doctorate, etc) by the audit committee’s size.  
The model we estimate for the board of directors in this section is: 
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For the audit committee, our empirical tests are based on the following model: 
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Where Ed_board and Ed_aud correspond respectively to the different variables, previously described, 
we use as proxies for the board and the audit committee education. 
Panel A and B of Table VI report respectively the results for the audit committee and the entire board 
of directors. According to the reported coefficients and p-values, the education of audit committee 
members has no effect on the risk management activity. Interestingly, the results corresponding to the 
entire board show that the hedging level is a decreasing function of the proportion of directors holding 
only a bachelor degree (%ba_board has a negative and significant coefficient at the 1% level) and an 
increasing function of the percentage of directors holding a degree superior to a bachelor 
(%supba_board has a positive and significant coefficient at the 1% level). Our findings suggest that (1) 
education is important for the directors sitting on the board, (2) directors holding a bachelor degree do 
not necessarily have the required skills to monitor properly the firm’s top management and 
consequently the latter will decrease the level of risk management even if it is beneficial to the firm, (3) 
directors holding a degree higher than a bachelor exercise a better control and the firm will increase its 
risk management activity in their presence. Our findings provide the first empirical evidence 
concerning the importance of university education for the directors sitting on the board. Our 
conclusions pertaining to the board/audit committee independence and other determinants of the 
hedging policy remain unchanged.  
(Insert Table VI here) 
 
VI. Joint examination of the board and the audit committee 
characteristics 
Thus far, we have analyzed the effect of board and audit committee independence, education and 
financial knowledge separately, as if these two institutions were independent. This way of doing does 
not allow us to determine whether it is the board or the audit committee characteristics that are driving 
the results. In this section, we combine in the same regression board and audit committee 
characteristics, in order to check the robustness of our findings. To do so, we construct for the board 
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(audit committee) a score variable called govindexbor (govindexaud) that combines information about 
the independence, education, and financial knowledge of its members. Govindexbor and govindexaud 
will be our proxies for the governance quality of the board and the audit committee. The higher the 
value of these variables, the better the governance quality of these institutions will be. Details 
concerning the methodology used to construct both scores are provided in Appendix 2. 
The model we estimate in this section is the following: 
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Table VII reports the results of our regression. Interestingly, govindexbor and govindexaud have 
positive and significant coefficients (at the 1% level) suggesting that a board/ audit committee with a 
good governance quality encourages corporate hedging. This finding confirms our previous conclusion 
that the board (audit committee) will act in the interest of shareholders when it has the competence to 
do so. The results also show that our previous findings concerning the board’s independence and 
financial knowledge are not driven by those relative to the audit committee. Accordingly, regulators 
should not only focus on the audit committee characteristics when setting corporate governance rules 
for modern corporations. The other results reported in Table VII are consistent with our previous 
findings.  
(Insert Table VII here) 
 
VII. The effect of risk management on the firm performance 
A. Basic model 
The empirical results reported in the previous sections show that independent and financially educated 
directors encourage hedging activities. These findings do not, however, necessarily imply that 
shareholders are better off with such directors on their boards and audit committees. In order to answer 
this question, we investigate the effect of corporate risk management on the firm’s performance. If a 
higher hedging ratio improves the firm’s performance and if independent and financially educated 
directors encourage risk management activities, we can assert that shareholders are better off with such 
directors on their boards and audit committees.  
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We use the return on equity (ROE) as a measure for the firm’s performance because it focuses on the 
actual financial rate of return to the firm’s owners. Therefore, it is an appropriate measure in terms of 
determining whether corporate hedging enhances the wealth of shareholders. Below, we describe the 
different arguments we control for and the theoretical background behind their inclusion: 
• Size: as the firm size increases, it becomes more difficult to sustain impressive performance 
[Banz, 1981]. Thus, larger firms are expected to report lower ROE. Allayannis and Weston 
(2001) reported evidence confirming this hypothesis. However, larger firms could report a 
higher performance because they benefit from greater diversification and economies of scale 
as well as cheaper sources of funds. We use the natural logarithm of net sales (Lnsales) as a 
proxy for the firm’s size and we conjecture that it could have a negative or a positive 
coefficient.  
• Risk management: different theories have been put forward to show that hedging is beneficial 
to the firm [Smith and Stulz, 1985; Stulz, 1990; DeMarzo and Duffie, 1991; Breeden and 
Viswanathan, 1998; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Morellec and Smith, 2002….etc.]. To 
the extent that hedging increases the firm’s performance, the ROE should be positively 
associated with our measure of corporate hedging, i.e. the Delta%. 
• Leverage: the impact of debt on the firm’s performance is not clear. Indeed, according to the 
agency theory, the monitoring provided by debt financing reduces management's incentive to 
squander free cash flows, and consequently should lead to a better firm performance. On the 
other hand, higher leverage makes the debt burden heavier and limits the firm in its investment 
choices. Our proxy for leverage is the long term debt divided by the firm’s market value 
(Leverage) and we offer no directional expectation concerning the sign of its coefficient. 
• Operational efficiency: as in Jin and Jorion (2004), we control for this argument because we 
think that firms with high operational costs are less likely to report a good performance. We 
measure the firm’s operational efficiency by its cash cost (Cost) defined as the operating cost 
of producing one ounce of gold, excluding all non-cash items such as depreciation, 
amortization and other financial costs. We expect the ROE to be negatively related to this 
variable. 
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• Investment opportunities: firms with greater investment opportunities are more likely to report 
a higher performance. We use the ratio of exploration expenditures to the firm’s value (Explo) 
as a proxy for investment opportunities and expect a positive coefficient for this variable.  
• Corporate governance characteristics: a strong corporate governance system should lead to a 
higher firm performance because the manager’s interests are more aligned with those of the 
shareholders. We use two proxies for internal corporate governance mechanisms: the 
proportion of unrelated directors on the board (%unr_board) and a dummy equal one if the 
CEO is also the chairman of the board (CEO_COB), 0 otherwise. We also use the percentage 
of shares held by institutions (%inst) as a proxy for external corporate governance 
mechanisms. We expect a negative coefficient for CEO_COB and positive ones for 
%unr_board and %inst. 
• Country effect: we think that the home country of the firm could affect its performance. We 
include a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is US, 0 otherwise (Dum_US) and we 
offer no directional expectation concerning its sign.  
• Market movements: gold mining firms are more likely to report a high performance when the 
gold market is bullish. We include the price of an ounce of gold in the spot market 
(Gold_price) to control for market movements and expect a positive sign for its coefficient.  
• Change in the management: newly hired managers usually need a certain amount of time to 
understand the firm’s operations and improve its performance. We include a dummy variable 
equal one if the CEO of the firm has changed during the past year, 0 otherwise (CEO_change) 
and we expect it to be negatively related to the ROE.  
The independent variables newly included in this section were hand collected except for the gold price 
which was obtained from DataStream and the ROE whose inputs were collected from COMPUSTAT 
Quarterly files. All independent variables are measured one quarter prior to the one in which the ROE 
is calculated in order to avoid endogeneity problems. The model we estimate in this section is: 
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In order to check the robustness of our findings, we estimate our model with four specifications: (1) a 
random effect specification, (2) a pooled OLS specification where we correct for clustering and 
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heteroschedasticity with the Huber-White sandwich estimate of standard errors (3) a random effect 
specification where we control for time by including dummies for years and, (4) a random effect 
specification where we control for time by including dummies for quarters. The results and conclusions 
drawn from these specifications are very similar. For the sake of brevity, Table VIII reports only the 
results obtained with the random effect specification. Interestingly, the coefficient of Delta% is positive 
and significant (at the 10% level) confirming that risk management is beneficial to the firm and its 
shareholders14. This finding confirms the conclusions reached by Allayannis and Weston (2001) and by 
Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2003), though they are based on a different measure of the firm’s 
performance, i.e. the Tobin’s Q. Our evidence combined with the one reported in Carter, Rogers and 
Simkins (2003) suggest that firms benefit from hedging their commodity risks and this is true 
regardless of whether the risk affects their revenues or costs. The gold price has also a positive and 
significant coefficient (at the 1% level) indicating that gold mining firms report a higher performance 
when the gold market is bullish. Furthermore, the results reported in table VIII suggest that the firm is 
more likely to report a poor performance when the CEO is also the chairman of the board (COB). This 
finding is expected because CEOs who are also COBs enjoy greater discretionary power and this 
allows them to realize some actions that do not necessarily benefit shareholders. 
(Insert Table VIII here) 
B. Control for the endogenous aspect of the risk management decision 
In section A, we showed that risk management, as measured by the Delta% increases the rate of return 
to the firm’s owners. However, there may be an alternative explanation for this finding. Indeed, 
profitable firms are usually under pressure to sustain their earnings and may have an added incentive to 
hedge. Therefore, a higher ROE for firms managing their risks could simply indicate that profitable 
firms have a greater incentive to hedge, and not that risk management leads to higher performance. In 
the previous section, we control for endogeneity by measuring Delta% one quarter prior to the one in 
which the ROE is calculated and this could be an insufficient remedy. In this section, we present a 
modeling strategy based on instrumental variables that controls for the possible endogeneity of the risk 
management policy. The estimation is done in two stages. In the first stage we calculate the predicted 
value of the firm’s risk management activity (Delta%*). We include the following variables to control 
                                                          
14 The relation between risk management and the firm’s ROE is even stronger when we control for time by including 
dummies for years and quarters (the coefficient of Delta% is significant at the 5% level in these models). The results 
obtained with these specifications are available from the authors upon request.  
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for the different aspects of the firm: CEO_CS, ValCEO_op, Taxsave, Leverage, Dum_US and %ins. 
We drop Explo and CEO_age from our model because they were hardly significant in previous 
regressions. Also, we include govindexbor and govindexaud in the model to capture information about 
the independence, financial knowledge and education of the board and the audit committee members.  
Econometrically speaking, if y  is the observed level of risk management and x is the vector of the 
above mentioned explanatory variables, we need to calculate [ ]xyE /  to get the predicted value of 
corporate hedging and this is not an easy task to achieve. Indeed, our model in this first stage 
corresponds to a Tobit specification with individual random effect. In order to calculate the predicted 
values, we extend the formula presented in Maddala (1986) to the case of a random effect Tobit model. 
The details of our calculation are provided in Appendix 3. In the second stage, we estimate the same 
model as in section A, except that we use the predicted value instead of the observed value of Delta% 
as explanatory variable.  
Panel A of Table IX reports the results for the first stage regression while Panel B reports the results for 
the second stage regression. Because we have already focused our attention in the previous sections on 
models similar to the one used in the first stage, we will limit our discussion to the results obtained in 
the second stage. Consistent with the findings reported in the previous section, the coefficient of 
Delta%* is positive and significant (at the 10% level) confirming that firms managing their risk report 
a higher performance for their shareholders. Accordingly, the positive relation between hedging and the 
firm’s performance reported earlier in the paper is not the result of an endogeneity problem. Our 
evidence also confirms that gold mining firms offer a higher return to their shareholders when the gold 
market is bullish. 
(Insert Table IX here) 
Overall, the findings reported in Tables III to IX suggest that the presence of independent and 
financially educated directors on the board and audit committee is beneficial to shareholders because it 
improves the firm’s performance through an increase of its hedging ratio. 
 
VIII. Conclusion and implications 
The goal of this research was to study the effect of the board and the audit committee independence and 
financial knowledge on the firm’s risk management activity. Our work is motivated by the new 
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regulation set by the SOX and the NYSE requiring such characteristics for publicly traded companies. 
The risk management policy is the perfect laboratory for such investigation because (1) the new 
regulation oblige the audit committee to discuss and control henceforth this activity, (2) it is well 
documented in the literature that risk management is beneficial to firms, a conclusion that we 
confirmed empirically for our sample and, (3) risk management implies dealing with financially 
sophisticated tools. Therefore, considering corporate hedging allows us to test whether an independent 
board/audit committee is capable of taking mandatory complicated decisions that are in the interest of 
shareholders or whether we need to impose financial knowledge on the directors to achieve this goal.  
We explore multiple definitions for a director who is financially knowledgeable: a director with any 
present or former activity or position related to finance, a director who has received an education 
offering financial literacy and finally a director who has an accounting background to be consistent 
with the SOX view. For each definition we assess the effect, on the firm’s hedging policy, of two 
requirements set by the SOX (audit committee entirely composed of independent members and at least 
one member who is financially knowledgeable) and four requirements set by the NYSE (majority of 
independent directors on the board, audit committee with a minimum of three members, each member 
of the audit committee must be financially literate, and at least one member of the audit committee 
must have accounting knowledge). We also investigate the effect of requiring a majority of financially 
knowledgeable directors on the board as well as the importance of university education for directors 
sitting on the audit committee and on the board. To conduct our tests, we constructed an original 
dataset that was hand collected. 
We find that the new requirements concerning the audit committee size and independence incite firms 
to seek more hedging, whereas the requirement of a majority of unrelated directors on the board has no 
effect on the corporate risk management activity. Likewise, directors with a financial activity and those 
with an accounting background seem to play no active role in the hedging policy. Interestingly, firms 
whose audit committees are entirely composed of financially educated directors and those whose 
boards have a majority of financially educated directors are more active in managing their risks. 
Therefore, only the directors’ financial education affects the risk management policy. Our empirical 
results also show that the educational level of board members, but not of the audit committee members, 
is an important determinant of the hedging ratio. Indeed, the hedging level is found to be a decreasing 
function of the proportion of directors holding only a bachelor degree (%ba_board) and an increasing 
function of the percentage of directors holding a degree superior to a bachelor (%supba_board). This 
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result is the first direct evidence concerning the importance of university education for the board of 
directors.  
The implications of this study are important for the SEC and stock exchanges. Our results suggest that 
the requirements on the audit committee size and independence are reasonable, although maintaining a 
majority of unrelated directors on the board and a director with an accounting background on the audit 
committee may not be necessary. Also, our findings show the need for the SEC and exchanges to 
provide a narrower definition for the financially knowledgeable term that emphasizes the importance of 
financial education. More importantly, our research suggests that the SEC and exchanges should not 
limit their attention to the independence and financial knowledge of the audit committee members 
when regulating corporate governance. Finally, the results we have reported show that university 
education for the directors sitting on the board could be considered in future regulation because it is 
beneficial to the firm.  
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) claim that the SOX will lead to a better corporate governance system as 
long as we can avoid overregulation. We also think that over regulating the US corporate governance 
system will represent a major problem for modern organizations but this does not mean we have to rule 
out new requirements that could be beneficial to shareholders simply because we fear overregulation.  
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Table I: Descriptive statistics  
This table reports descriptive statistics for our variables. Tot_ind_aud is a dummy equal “1” if the audit committee is 
entirely composed of unrelated directors, “0” otherwise; OnefinAct_aud is a dummy equal “1” if at least one member of the 
audit committee is financially active, “0” otherwise; OnefinEdu_aud is a dummy equal “1” if at least one member of the 
audit committee is financially educated, “0” otherwise; OneAcc_aud is a dummy equal “1” if at least one member of the 
audit committee has an accounting background, “0” otherwise; Maj_unr_board is a dummy equal “1” if the majority of the 
board is constituted of unrelated directors, “0” otherwise; Minsize_aud is a dummy equal “1” if the audit committee has at 
least three members, “0” otherwise.; AllfinAct_aud is a dummy equal one if all the directors sitting on the audit committee 
are financially active, “0” otherwise; AllfinEdu_aud is a dummy equal one if all the directors sitting on the audit committee 
are financially educated, “0” otherwise; %Acc_aud is the proportion of directors with an accounting background sitting on 
the audit committee; %unr_board is the proportion of unrelated directors in the board; MajfinAct_board and 
(MajfinEdu_board) are dummy variable equal “1” if the majority of the directors sitting on the board are financially active 
(educated), “0” Otherwise; %Acc_board is the proportion of directors with an accounting background sitting on the board; 
OneAcc_board is a dummy equal “1” if at least one member of the board has an accounting background, “0” otherwise; 
%inst is the percentage of shares held by institutions; Taxsave is a measure of the convexity-based tax advantage of 
hedging; CEO_CS is the number of the firm’s common shares held by the CEO; ValCEO_op is the value of options held by 
the CEO; CEO_age is the CEO age; Leverage is the book value of the long-term debt divided by the firm’s market value; 
Explo is the firm’s exploration expenditures scaled by its market value. %ba_board (%ba_aud) is the proportion of directors 
holding a bachelor degree in the board (audit committee); %supba_board (%supba_aud) is the proportion of directors 
holding a degree higher than a bachelor in the board (audit committee); Finally, Dum_US is a dummy equal “1” if the firm 
is US, “0” otherwise.  
 
Variables  N Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Panel A: General Characteristics 
Leverage 347 0.125 0.086 0.129 
Taxsave 347 0.144 0.052 0.260 
Explo 347 0.004 0.003 0.010 
%inst 347 0.083 0.064 0.093 
Panel B: Board Structure 
Maj_unr_board 347 0.761 1.000 0.427 
%unr_board 347 0.613 0.615 0.186 
MajfinAct_board 347 0.098 0.000 0.298 
MajfinEdu_board 347 0.213 0.000 0.410 
OneAcc_board 347 0.706 1.000 0.456 
%Acc_board 347 0.133 0.125 0.110 
%ba_board 324 0.599 0.583 0.175 
%supba_board 324 0.335 0.308 0.180 
Panel C: Audit Committee Structure 
Tot_ind_aud 347 0.519 1.000 0.500 
AllfinEdu_aud 324 0.077 0.000 0.267 
OnefinEdu_aud 324 0.870 1.000 0.336 
AllfinAct_aud 347 0.078 0.000 0.268 
OnefinAct_aud 347 0.882 1.000 0.323 
Minsize_aud 347 0.916 1.000 0.277 
OneAcc_aud 347 0.473 0.000 0.500 
%Acc_aud 347 0.197 0.000 0.240 
%ba_aud 324 0.610 0.667 0.270 
%supba_aud 324 0.328 0.333 0.269 
Panel D: CEO Characteristics 
CEO_CS (millions) 347 1.040 0.060 2.769 
ValCEO_op CS (millions)  347 1.690 0.000 6.733 
CEO_age 347 54.305 54.000 7.463 
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Table II: Univariate analysis 
This table reports a univariate analysis of the variables used in the regressions. We break down the sample into two groups 
according to the risk management level adopted by the firm. The first group has a low level of risk management (delta 
percentage not greater than 50%) and the second group has a high level of risk management (delta percentage strictly 
greater than 50%). The table reports descriptive statistics for both groups as well as results corresponding to a t-test of the 
differences in the means and to a non parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test. Tot_ind_aud is a dummy equal “1” if the audit 
committee is entirely composed of unrelated directors, “0” otherwise; OnefinAct_aud is a dummy equal “1” if at least one 
member of the audit committee is financially active, “0” otherwise; OnefinEdu_aud is a dummy equal “1” if at least one 
member of the audit committee is financially educated, “0” otherwise; OneAcc_aud is a dummy equal “1” if at least one 
member of the audit committee has an accounting background, “0” otherwise; Maj_unr_board is a dummy equal “1” if the 
majority of the board is constituted of unrelated directors, “0” otherwise; Minsize_aud is a dummy equal “1” if the audit 
committee has at least three members, “0” otherwise.; AllfinAct_aud is a dummy equal one if all the directors sitting on the 
audit committee are financially active, “0” otherwise; AllfinEdu_aud is a dummy equal one if all the directors sitting on the 
audit committee are financially educated, “0” otherwise; %Acc_aud is the proportion of directors with an accounting 
background sitting on the audit committee; %unr_board is the proportion of unrelated directors in the board; 
MajfinAct_board and (MajfinEdu_board) are dummy variable equal “1” if the majority of the directors sitting on the board 
are financially active (educated), “0” Otherwise; %Acc_board is the proportion of directors with an accounting background 
sitting on the board; OneAcc_board is a dummy equal “1” if at least one member of the board has an accounting 
background, “0” otherwise; %inst is the percentage of shares held by institutions; Taxsave is a measure of the convexity-
based tax advantage of hedging; CEO_CS is the number of the firm’s common shares held by the CEO; ValCEO_op is the 
value of options held by the CEO; CEO_age is the CEO age; Leverage is the book value of the long-term debt divided by 
the firm’s market value; Explo is the firm’s exploration expenditures scaled by its market value. %ba_board (%ba_aud) is 
the proportion of directors holding a bachelor degree in the board (audit committee); %supba_board (%supba_aud) is the 
proportion of directors holding a degree higher than a bachelor in the board (audit committee); Finally, Dum_US is a 
dummy equal “1” if the firm is US, “0” otherwise. The significant values at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are respectively 
marked with three, two and one asterisks. 
 
Variables Mean Median 
 High Low p-value High Low p-value
Panel A: General Characteristics 
Leverage 0.154 0.118 0.049** 0.106 0.083 0.031** 
Taxsave 0.173 0.136 0.479 0.012 0.064 0.000*** 
Explo 0.006 0.004 0.382 0.002 0.003 0.030** 
%inst 0.086 0.082 0.700 0.087 0.055 0.299 
Panel B: Board Structure 
Maj_unr_board 0.685 0.781 0.114 1.000 1.000 0.088* 
%unr_board 0.541 0.633 0.000*** 0.556 0.625 0.001*** 
MajfinAct_board 0.068 0.106 0.289 0.000 0.000 0.341 
MajfinEdu_board 0.164 0.226 0.223 0.000 0.000 0.252 
OneAcc_board 0.849 0.668 0.001*** 1.000 1.000 0.003*** 
%Acc_board 0.138 0.131 0.561 0.143 0.125 0.498 
%ba_board(1) 0.563 0.609 0.014** 0.600 0.583 0.171 
%supba_board 0.384 0.322 0.005*** 0.333 0.293 0.002*** 
Panel C: Audit Committee Structure 
Tot_unr_aud 0.603 0.496 0.105 1.000 0.000 0.107 
AllfinEdu_aud (1) 0.043 0.087 0.148 0.000 0.000 0.225 
OnefinEdu_aud (1) 0.871 0.870 0.976 1.000 1.000 0.976 
AllfinAct_aud 0.014 0.095 0.003*** 0.000 0.000 0.022** 
OnefinAct_aud 0.890 0.880 0.795 1.000 1.000 0.799 
Minsize_aud 1.000 0.894 0.000*** 1.000 1.000 0.004*** 
OneAcc_aud 0.411 0.489 0.235 0.000 0.000 0.236 
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%Acc_aud 0.137 0.213 0.003*** 0.000 0.000 0.061* 
%ba_aud (1) 0.479 0.647 0.000*** 0.500 0.667 0.000*** 
%supba_aud (1) 0.475 0.287 0.000*** 0.500 0.250 0.000*** 
Panel D: CEO Characteristics 
CEO_CS CS (millions) 1.543 0.906 0.023** 0.570 0.050 0.000*** 
ValCEO_op CS (millions) 6.733 0.346 0.000*** 0.000 0.010 0.442 
CEO_age 56.644 53.682 0.013** 54 54 0.029** 
Number of observations for 
the High group 
73 
 
Number of observations for 
the Low group 
274 
 
(1) Statistics for these variables are reported for total number of observations of 70 for the High 
group and 254 for the Low group.  
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Table III: Results for financially active directors 
In this table we are investigating the effect of the board and audit committee members’ independence and financial activity on the risk management policy of the firm. 
The results are reported for a random effect Tobit specification. Our dependent variable is the delta percentage (Delta%). Panel A reports the results for the audit 
committee and Panel B reports the results corresponding to the whole board. Tot_ind_aud is a dummy equal “1” if the audit committee is entirely composed of unrelated 
directors, “0” otherwise; OnefinAct_aud is a dummy equal “1” if at least one member of the audit committee is financially active, “0” otherwise; Maj_unr_board is a 
dummy equal “1” if the majority of the board is constituted of unrelated directors, “0” otherwise; Minsize_aud is a dummy equal “1” if the audit committee has at least 
three members, “0” otherwise.; AllfinAct_aud is a dummy equal one if all the directors sitting on the audit committee are financially active, “0” otherwise; Tot_ind_aud x 
OnefinAct_aud is Tot_ind_aud multiplied by OnefinAct_aud, Tot_ind_aud x AllfinAct_aud is Tot_ind_aud multiplied by AllfinAct_aud, %unr_board is the proportion of 
unrelated directors in the board; MajfinAct_board is a dummy variable equal “1” if the majority of the directors sitting on the board are financially active, “0” Otherwise; 
%unr_board x MajfinAct_board is %unr_board multiplied by MajfinAct_board; %inst is the percentage of shares held by institutions; Taxsave is a measure of the 
convexity-based tax advantage of hedging; CEO_CS is the number of the firm’s common shares held by the CEO; ValCEO_op is the value of options held by the CEO; 
CEO_age is the CEO age; Leverage is the book value of the long-term debt divided by the firm’s market value; Explo is the firm’s exploration expenditures scaled by its 
market value. Finally, Dum_US is a dummy equal “1” if the firm is US, “0” otherwise. The significant values at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are respectively marked with 
three, two and one asterisks. 
 
Panel A: results for the audit committee members 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
CEO_CS 0.0122 0.002*** 0.0114 0.004*** 0.0120 0.003*** 0.0140 0.001*** 
ValCEO_op -0.0051 0.010** -0.0050 0.010** -0.0030 0.100** -0.0078 0.001*** 
Taxsave 0.1099 0.006*** 0.1082 0.006*** 0.0764 0.052** 0.1336 0.003*** 
Leverage 0.7780 0.000*** 0.7947 0.000*** 1.0354 0.000*** 0.7010 0.000*** 
Explo -0.6888 0.447 -0.7829 0.381 -1.2028 0.190 -0.4974 0.604 
Dum_US -0.1323 0.000*** -0.1439 0.000*** -0.1036 0.000*** -0.0956 0.002*** 
Tot_ind_aud 0.1228 0.000*** 0.1275 0.000***     
OnefinAct_aud 0.0087 0.789       
AllfinAct_aud   -0.0593 0.254     
Tot_ind_aud x 
OnefinAct_aud 
    0.2388 0.000   
Tot_ind_aud x 
AllfinAct_aud 
      -0.0154 0.816 
Minsize_aud 0.1148 0.007*** 0.1070 0.012** 0.2120 0.000*** 0.0970 0.040*** 
%inst -0.6833 0.000*** -0.6497 0.000*** -0.9024 0.000*** -0.5175 0.000*** 
CEO_age 0.0001 0.973 -0.0001 0.956 -0.0015 0.407 0.0003 0.851 
Intercept 0.0815 0.463 0.1089 0.302 -0.0438 0.661 0.1096 0.337 
Log likelihood 33.70 34.30 36.97 19.78 
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Panel B: results for the board members 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
CEO_CS 0.0135 0.001*** 0.0120 0.002*** 0.0146 0.001*** 
ValCEO_op -0.0087 0.000*** -0.0091 0.000*** -0.0080 0.001*** 
Taxsave 0.1337 0.001*** 0.1675 0.000*** 0.1362 0.002*** 
Leverage 0.6960 0.000*** 0.8071 0.000*** 0.6927 0.000*** 
Explo -0.4370 0.646 -1.0156 0.279 -0.4658 0.637 
Dum_US -0.1114 0.001*** -0.1674 0.000*** -0.0877 0.006*** 
Maj_unr_board 0.0421 0.192     
%unr_board   0.3343 0.000***   
MajfinAct_board 0.0278 0.479 0.0172 0.640   
%unr_board x 
MajfinAct_board 
    0.0650 0.325 
%inst -0.5617 0.000*** -0.7466 0.000*** -0.5226 0.000*** 
CEO_age 0.0011 0.587 -0.0013 0.506 0.0004 0.838 
Intercept 0.1403 0.193 0.1313 0.210 0.1889 0.072* 
Log likelihood 19.10 24.46 17.76 
Number of Observations :  347 
Uncensored observations:  296 
Censored observations:  51 
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Table IV: Results for financially educated directors 
In this table we are investigating the effect of the board and audit committee members’ independence and financial education on the risk management policy of the firm. 
The results are reported for a random effect Tobit specification. Our dependent variable is the delta percentage (Delta%). Panel A reports the results for the audit 
committee and Panel B reports the results corresponding to the whole board. Tot_ind_aud is a dummy equal “1” if the audit committee is entirely composed of unrelated 
directors, “0” otherwise; OnefinEdu_aud is a dummy equal “1” if at least one member of the audit committee is financially educated, “0” otherwise; Maj_unr_board is a 
dummy equal “1” if the majority of the board is constituted of unrelated directors, “0” otherwise; Minsize_aud is a dummy equal “1” if the audit committee has at least 
three members, “0” otherwise.; AllfinEdu_aud is a dummy equal one if all the directors sitting on the audit committee are financially educated, “0” otherwise; 
Tot_ind_aud x OnefinEdu_aud is Tot_ind_aud multiplied by OnefinEdu_aud, Tot_ind_aud x AllfinEdu_aud is Tot_ind_aud multiplied by AllfinEdu_aud, %unr_board is 
the proportion of unrelated directors in the board; MajfinEdu_board is a dummy variable equal “1” if the majority of the directors sitting on the board are financially 
educated, “0” Otherwise; %unr_board x MajfinEdu_board is %unr_board multiplied by MajfinEdu_board; %inst is the percentage of shares held by institutions; 
Taxsave is a measure of the convexity-based tax advantage of hedging; CEO_CS is the number of the firm’s common shares held by the CEO; ValCEO_op is the value 
of options held by the CEO; CEO_age is the CEO age; Leverage is the book value of the long-term debt divided by the firm’s market value; Explo is the firm’s 
exploration expenditures scaled by its market value. Finally, Dum_US is a dummy equal “1” if the firm is US, “0” otherwise. The significant values at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level are respectively marked with three, two and one asterisks. 
 
Panel A: results for the audit committee members 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
CEO_CS 0.0116 0.003*** 0.0082 0.046** 0.0175 0.000*** 0.0185 0.000*** 
ValCEO_op -0.0052 0.008*** -0.0053 0.006*** -0.0065 0.001*** -0.0043 0.029** 
Taxsave 0.1930 0.000*** 0.1901 0.000*** 0.2367 0.000*** 0.1640 0.000*** 
Leverage 1.2967 0.000*** 0.6973 0.000*** 0.8514 0.000*** 0.6233 0.000*** 
Explo -1.3183 0.130 -0.7977 0.354 -0.6738 0.434 -0.3284 0.709 
Dum_US -0.1436 0.000*** -0.2027 0.000*** -0.2779 0.000*** -0.1027 0.000*** 
Tot_ind_aud 0.3279 0.000*** 0.2578 0.000***     
OnefinEdu_aud 0.0216 0.525       
AllfinEdu_aud   0.0625 0.080*     
Tot_ind_aud x 
OnefinEdu_aud 
    0.3633 0.000***   
Tot_ind_aud x 
AllfinEdu_aud 
      0.2401 0.000*** 
Minsize_aud 0.3166 0.000*** 0.2552 0.000*** 0.2326 0.000*** 0.0736 0.074* 
%inst -0.8355 0.000*** -1.0355 0.000*** -0.9402 0.000*** -0.6567 0.000*** 
CEO_age -0.002 0.240 0.0019 0.319 0.0009 0.692 0.0035 0.050** 
Intercept -0.2720 0.007*** -0.1841 0.072* -0.0890 0.488 -0.1730 0.862 
Log likelihood 50.58 50.38 43.12 41.47 
Number of Observations :  324 
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Uncensored observations:  285 
Censored observations:  39 
Panel B: results for the board members 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
CEO_CS 0.0143 0.000*** 0.0130 0.001*** 0.0159 0.000*** 
ValCEO_op -0.0122 0.000*** -0.0100  0.000*** -0.0075 0.001*** 
Taxsave 0.1330 0.001*** 0.1568 0.000*** 0.1349 0.002*** 
Leverage 0.7775 0.000*** 0.8668 0.000*** 0.7163 0.000*** 
Explo -0.7623 0.405 -0.9081 0.336 -0.5242 0.579 
Dum_US -0.1492 0.000*** -0.1632 0.000*** -0.0846 0.009*** 
Maj_unr_board 0.0853 0.002***     
%unr_board   0.3679 0.000***   
MajfinEdu_boad 0.1067 0.000*** 0.0850 0.006***   
%unr_board x 
MajfinEdu_boad 
    0.0943 0.065* 
%inst -0.7346 0.000*** -0.8570 0.000*** -0.5604 0.000*** 
CEO_age 0.0024 0.177 -0.0006 0.743 0.0009 0.630 
Intercept 0.0652 0.506 0.0712 0.505 0.1510 0.143 
Log likelihood 20.68 27.44 19.03 
Number of Observations :  349 
Uncensored observations:  296 
Censored observations:  51 
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Table V: Results for directors with an accounting background 
In this table we are investigating the effect of the board and audit committee members’ independence and accounting background on the risk management policy of the 
firm. The results are reported for a random effect Tobit specification. Our dependent variable is the delta percentage (Delta%). Panel A reports the results for the audit 
committee and Panel B and C report the results corresponding to the whole board. Tot_ind_aud is a dummy equal “1” if the audit committee is entirely composed of 
unrelated directors, “0” otherwise; OneAcc_aud is a dummy equal “1” if at least one member of the audit committee has an accounting background, “0” otherwise; 
Maj_unr_board is a dummy equal “1” if the majority of the board is constituted of unrelated directors, “0” otherwise; Minsize_aud is a dummy equal “1” if the audit 
committee has at least three members, “0” otherwise.; %Acc_aud is the proportion of directors with an accounting background sitting on the audit committee; 
Tot_ind_aud x OneAcc_aud is Tot_ind_aud multiplied by OneAcc_aud, Tot_ind_aud x %Acc_aud is Tot_ind_aud multiplied by %Acc_aud, %unr_board is the 
proportion of unrelated directors in the board; %Acc_board is the proportion of directors with an accounting background sitting on the board; OneAcc_board is a dummy 
equal “1” if at least one member of the board has an accounting background, “0” otherwise; %unr_board x OneAcc_board is %unr_board multiplied by OneAcc_board; 
%unr_board x %Acc_board is %unr_board multiplied by %Acc_board; %inst is the percentage of shares held by institutions; Taxsave is a measure of the convexity-
based tax advantage of hedging; CEO_CS is the number of the firm’s common shares held by the CEO; ValCEO_op is the value of options held by the CEO; CEO_age 
is the CEO age; Leverage is the book value of the long-term debt divided by the firm’s market value; Explo is the firm’s exploration expenditures scaled by its market 
value; Finally, Dum_US is a dummy equal “1” if the firm is US, “0” otherwise. The significant values at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are respectively marked with three, 
two and one asterisks. 
Panel A: results for the audit committee members 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
CEO_CS 0.0122 0.002*** 0.0125 0.002*** 0.0205 0.000*** 0.0166 0.000*** 
ValCEO_op -0.0052 0.011** -0.0033 0.071* -0.0053 0.007*** -0.0030 0.163 
Taxsave 0.1094 0.007*** 0.0724 0.073* 0.2187 0.000*** 0.1061 0.019** 
Leverage 0.7763 0.000*** 1.0308 0.000*** 0.7403 0.000*** 0.7571 0.000*** 
Explo -0.7171 0.425 -1.1899 0.193 -0.8455 0.332 -0.8093 0.376 
Dum_US -0.1324 0.000*** -0.0996 0.001*** -0.0904 0.002*** -0.1225 0.000*** 
Tot_ind_aud 0.1228 0.000*** 0.2380 0.000***     
OneAcc_aud -0.0030 0.895       
%Acc_aud   -0.0074 0.878     
Tot_ind_aud x 
OneAcc_aud 
    0.3038 0.000***   
Tot_ind_aud x 
%Acc_aud 
      0.4462 0.000*** 
Minsize_aud 0.1180 0.006*** 0.2177 0.000*** 0.0810 0.047** 0.0786 0.063* 
%inst -0.6724 0.000*** -0.8856 0.000*** -0.6640 0.000*** -0.9565 0.000*** 
CEO_age 0.0001 0.975 -0.0016 0.376 0.0033 0.062* 0.0031 0.110 
Intercept 0.0877 0.417 -0.0473 0.637 -0.1697 0.081* -0.1053 0.307 
Log likelihood 33.67 34.66 39.96 31.86 
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Panel B: results for the board members 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Coef p-
value 
Coef p-
value 
Coef p-
value 
Coef p-
value 
Coef p-
value 
Coef p-
value 
CEO_CS 0.0136 0.001*** 0.0135 0.001*** 0.0117 0.002*** 0.0119 0.002*** 0.0188 0.000*** 0.0148 0.000*** 
ValCEO_op -0.0090 0.000*** -0.0090 0.000*** -0.0085 0.000*** -0.0091 0.000*** -0.0052 0.014** -0.0078 0.001*** 
Taxsave 0.1326 0.002*** 0.1343 0.002*** 0.1688 0.000*** 0.1670 0.000*** 0.1360 0.001*** 0.1346 0.003*** 
Leverage 0.6889 0.000*** 0.6897 0.000*** 0.8071 0.000*** 0.8077 0.000*** 0.6345 0.000*** 0.7039 0.000*** 
Explo -0.4706 0.621 -0.4571 0.631 -1.0806 0.246 -1.0392 0.256 -0.5818 0.549 -0.5627 0.564 
Dum_US -0.1163 0.001*** -0.1172 0.000*** -0.1748 0.000*** -0.1697 0.000*** -0.1204 0.004*** -0.0954 0.002*** 
Maj_unr_board 0.0472 0.141 0.0462 0.153         
%unr_board     0.3374 0.000*** 0.3326 0.000***     
%Acc_board -0.0049 0.962   -0.0659 0.502       
OneAcc_board   -0.0074 0.785   -0.0055 0.835     
%unr_board x 
OneAcc_board 
        0.0028 0.964   
%unr_board x 
%Acc_board 
          0.0805 0.591 
%inst -0.5564 0.000*** -0.5510 0.000*** -0.7487 0.000*** -0.7374 0.000*** -0.5896 0.007*** -0.5272 0.000*** 
CEO_age 0.0010 0.619 0.0011 0.586 -0.0012 0.536 -0.0013 0.487 0.0035 0.097* 0.0002 0.905 
Intercept 0.1467 0.180 0.1464 0.177 0.1399 0.173 0.1410 0.171 -0.0597 0.547 0.1983 0.057* 
Log likelihood 18.37 18.41 24.97 24.37 20.62 17.95 
Number of Observations :  347 
Uncensored observations:  296 
Censored observations:  51 
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Table VI: Results for the education of the directors 
In this table we are investigating the effect of the board and audit committee members’ education on the risk management 
policy of the firm. The results are reported for a random effect Tobit specification. Our dependent variable is the delta 
percentage (Delta%). Panel A reports the results for the audit committee and Panel B and C report the results corresponding 
to the whole board. Tot_ind_aud is a dummy equal “1” if the audit committee is entirely composed of unrelated directors, 
“0” otherwise; %ba_board is the proportion of directors holding a bachelor degree in the board; %supba_board is the 
proportion of directors holding a degree higher than a bachelor in the board; %ba_aud is the proportion of directors holding 
a bachelor degree in the audit committee; %supba_aud is the proportion of directors holding a degree higher than a bachelor 
in the audit committee; Maj_unr_board is a dummy equal “1” if the majority of the board is constituted of unrelated 
directors, “0” otherwise; Minsize_aud is a dummy equal “1” if the audit committee has at least three members, “0” 
otherwise.; %unr_board is the proportion of unrelated directors in the board; %inst is the percentage of shares held by 
institutions; Taxsave is a measure of the convexity-based tax advantage of hedging; CEO_CS is the number of the firm’s 
common shares held by the CEO; ValCEO_op is the value of options held by the CEO; CEO_age is the CEO age; Leverage 
is the book value of the long-term debt divided by the firm’s market value; Explo is the firm’s exploration expenditures 
scaled by its market value. Finally, Dum_US is a dummy equal “1” if the firm is US, “0” otherwise. The significant values 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are respectively marked with three, two and one asterisks. 
 
Panel A: results for the audit committee members 
Variables  Model 1 Model2 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
CEO_CS 0.0085 0.039** 0.0137 0.001*** 
ValCEO_op -0.0057 0.003*** -0.0048 0.017** 
Taxsave 0.1833 0.000*** 0.1645 0.000*** 
Leverage 0.6884 0.000*** 0.7030 0.000*** 
Explo -0.8057 0.353 -0.4755 0.599 
Dum_US -0.1995 0.000*** -0.1420 0.000*** 
Tot_ind_aud 0.2481 0.000*** 0.1096 0.000*** 
%ba_aud -0.0081 0.854   
%supba_aud   -0.0207 0.675 
Minsize_aud 0.2432 0.000*** 0.1111 0.007*** 
%inst -1.0078 0.000*** -0.6981 0.000*** 
CEO_age 0.0023 0.207 0.0017 0.465 
Intercept -0.1832 0.097* 0.0249 0.831 
Log likelihood 47.78 45.66 
Panel B: results for boards with an independent majority 
Variables Model 2 Model 2 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
CEO_CS 0.0118 0.001*** 0.0170 0.000*** 
ValCEO_op -0.0096 0.000*** -0.0078 0.001*** 
Taxsave 0.1883 0.000*** 0.2061 0.000*** 
Leverage 0.7749 0.000*** 0.6932 0.000*** 
Explo -0.9654 0.276 -0.5184 0.621 
Dum_US -0.2016 0.000*** -0.2777 0.000*** 
Maj_unr_board 0.0189 0.476 0.0749 0.041** 
%ba_board -0.5644 0.000***   
%supba_board   0.5674 0.000*** 
%inst -0.3757 0.003*** -0.5846 0.000*** 
CEO_age -0.0008 0.666 0.0060 0.017** 
Intercept -0.5685 0.000*** -0.3283 0.011** 
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Log likelihood 37.09 36.83 
Panel C: results for the board with % of unrelated directors 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
CEO_CS 0.0125 0.001*** 0.0149 0.000*** 
ValCEO_op -0.0078 0.000*** -0.0071 0.001*** 
Taxsave 0.2789 0.000*** 0.2518 0.000*** 
Leverage 0.8085 0.000*** 0.9427 0.000*** 
Explo -1.4841 0.354 -1.3475 0.211 
Dum_US -0.2865 0.000*** -0.2794 0.000*** 
%unr_board 0.5462 0.000*** 0.5239 0.000*** 
%ba_board -0.2618 0.000***   
%supba_board   0.2683 0.000*** 
%inst -0.6419 0.000*** -0.6163 0.000*** 
CEO_age 0.0032 0.090* 0.0024 0.212 
Intercept -0.0904 0.418 -0.2973 0.004*** 
Log likelihood 38.56 38.90 
Number of Observations 
Uncensored observations 
Censored observations 
324 
285 
39 
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Table VII: Results with the governance scores 
In this table we are investigating the effect of the board and audit committee members’ characteristics, when they are put 
together, on the risk management policy of the firm. The results are reported for a random effect Tobit specification. Our 
dependent variable is the delta percentage (Delta%). Govindexbor govindexaud are scores measuring respectively the 
quality of the board and the audit committee and %inst is the percentage of shares held by institutions; Taxsave is a measure 
of the convexity-based tax advantage of hedging; CEO_CS is the number of the firm’s common shares held by the CEO; 
ValCEO_op is the value of options held by the CEO; CEO_age is the CEO age; Leverage is the book value of the long-term 
debt divided by the firm’s market value; Explo is the firm’s exploration expenditures scaled by its market value. Finally, 
Dum_US is a dummy equal “1” if the firm is US, “0” otherwise. The significant values at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are 
respectively marked with three, two and one asterisks. 
 
Variables  Coefficient p-value 
CEO_CS 0.0166 0.000*** 
ValCEO_op -0.0072 0.000*** 
Taxsave 0.2973 0.000*** 
Leverage 0.9538 0.000*** 
Explo -1.5377 0.094* 
Dum_US -0.2746 0.000*** 
Govindexbor  0.0383 0.001*** 
Govindexaud  0.0742 0.000*** 
%inst -1.0303 0.000*** 
CEO_age 0.0039 0.044** 
Intercept -0.3280 0.002*** 
Log likelihood  38.24 
Number of Observations 
Uncensored observations 
Censored observations 
324 
285 
39 
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Table VIII: Results for the firm performance with the observed level of 
risk management 
In this table we are investigating the effect of the firm’s risk management activities on its performance as measured by the 
return on equity (ROE). The results are reported for a random effect specification. Our dependent variable is the ROE 
calculated as the income before extraordinary items divided by common equity. Delta% is the delta of the risk management 
portfolio held by the firm divided by its production during the same period; Lnsales is the natural logarithm of the firm’s 
sales; Leverage is the long term debt divided by the firm’s market value; Cost is the operating cost of producing one ounce 
of gold, excluding all non-cash items such as depreciation, amortization and other financial costs; Explo is the ratio of 
exploration expenditures to the firm’s value, %unr_board is the proportion of unrelated directors in the board; CEO_COB is 
a dummy equal one if the CEO of the firm is also the chairman of the board, 0 otherwise; %inst is the percentage of shares 
held by institutions; Dum_US is a dummy variable equal one if the firm is US, 0 otherwise; Gold_price is the price of an 
ounce of gold in the sport market expressed in thousands of USD and finally, CEO_change is a dummy variable equal one 
if the CEO of the firm changed during the past year, 0 otherwise. All independent variables are measured one quarter prior 
to the one in which the ROE is calculated in order to avoid endogeneity problems. The significant values at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level are respectively marked with three, two and one asterisks. 
 
Variables Coefficient p-value 
Delta% 0.1092 0.069* 
Lnsales 0.0004 0.979 
Leverage -0.0952 0.458 
Cost 0.0036 0.991 
Explo 0.2448 0.874 
%unr_board 0.1337 0.187 
CEO_COB -0.0629 0.099* 
%inst -0.0613 0.741 
Dum_US -0.051 0.215 
Gold_price 0.0016 0.000*** 
CEO_Change -0.051 0.282 
Intercept -0.6119 0.001*** 
Log likelihood -56.82 
Number of observations 343 
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Table IX: Results for the firm performance with the predicted level of 
risk management 
In this table we are investigating the effect of the firm’s risk management activities on its performance as measured by the 
return on equity. The results are reported for random effect specifications (a random effect Tobit model in the first stage and 
a random effect model in the second stage). Panel A reports the results for the first stage of our estimation procedure. Our 
dependent variable is the Delta%. Govindexbor govindexaud are scores measuring respectively the quality of the board and 
the audit committee; %inst is the percentage of shares held by institutions; Taxsave is a measure of the convexity-based tax 
advantage of hedging; CEO_CS is the number of the firm’s common shares held by the CEO; ValCEO_op is the value of 
options held by the CEO; Leverage is the book value of the long-term debt divided by the firm’s market value; Finally, 
Dum_US is a dummy equal “1” if the firm is US, “0” otherwise. Panel B reports the results for the second stage of our 
estimation procedure where we investigate the effect of risk management on the firm performance. Our dependent variable 
is the ROE calculated as the income before extraordinary items divided by the firm’s common equity. Delta%* is the 
predicted level of risk management obtained from the model in the first step; Lnsales is the natural logarithm of the firm’s 
sales; Cost is the operating cost of producing one ounce of gold, excluding all non-cash items such as depreciation, 
amortization and other financial costs; Explo is the ratio of exploration expenditures to the firm’s value, %unr_board is the 
proportion of unrelated directors in the board; CEO_COB is a dummy equal one if the CEO of the firm is also the chairman 
of the board, 0 otherwise; Gold_price is the price of an ounce of gold in the sport market expressed in thousands of USD 
and finally, CEO_change is a dummy variable equal one if the CEO of the firm changed during the past year, 0 otherwise. 
The significant values at the 1%, 5% and 1% level are respectively marked with three, two and one asterisks. 
 
Variables Coefficient p-value 
Panel A: results for the first stage estimation: getting the predicted values of RM 
CEO_CS 0.0096 0.011** 
ValCEO_op -0.0055 0.003*** 
Taxsave 0.2202 0.000*** 
Leverage 0.6339 0.000*** 
Dum_US -0.1187 0.000*** 
Govindexbor  0.0271 0.020** 
Govindexaud  0.0964 0.000*** 
%inst -1.1382 0.000*** 
Intercept -0.1274 0.051* 
Log likelihood  34.25 
Number of Observations 
Uncensored observations 
Censored observations 
324 
285 
39 
Panel B: results for the second stage estimation: the effect of RM on the firm ROE 
Delta%* 0.4563 0.057* 
Lnsales 0.0094 0.631 
Leverage -0.1932 0.284 
Cost -0.0847 0.831 
Explo 0.5552 0.756 
%unr_board 0.0867 0.560 
CEO_COB -0.0311 0.504 
%inst 0.2107 0.417 
Dum_US -0.0394 0.486 
Gold_price 0.0015 0.002*** 
CEO_Change -0.0244 0.635 
Intercept -0.6816 0.001*** 
Log likelihood -46.55 
Number of observations 320 
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Appendix 1: Data sources checked for biographical information 
concerning the directors sitting on the board and on the audit committee 
 
 
Publications 
 
1- The international who’s who 
2- Canadian who’s who  
3- Who’s who in America 
4- S&P register of corporations, directors and executives 
5- Who’s who in Canada 
6- Who’s who in America 
7- Who’s who in Canadian business 
8- Who’s who in Finance 
9- The Northern Miner 
10- Who’s who in finance and industry  
11- The Financial Post directory of directors 
12- Who’s who in Canadian finance 
13- The blue book of Canadian businesses 
14- Who’s who in Ontario 
15- Encyclopedia of British Columbia 
16- Who’s who in British Columbia 
17- Who’s who in Australia  
18- Who’s who in the West 
19- Who’s who in the South and Southwest 
 
Electronic sources 
 
1- Firms websites available in the internet and google search engine 
2- Proquest ABI/Inform 
3- Factiva provided by Reuters 
4- EDGAR Online 
5- Lexis-Nexis  
6- EUREKA.CC 
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Appendix 2: Details concerning the construction of the board and the 
audit committee governance scores 
 
In order to construct the governance score for the board, we construct the following dummy variables: 
 
1) D1=1 if the majority of the board is composed of unrelated directors, 0 Otherwise 
2) D2=1 if the majority of the board is financially active, 0 Otherwise  
3) D3=1 if the majority of the board is financially educated, 0 Otherwise 
4) D4=1 if there is at least one director with an accounting background in the board, 0 Otherwise 
5) D5=1 if the CEO and COB positions are held by the same person, 0 Otherwise  
6) D6=1 if the average tenure in the board for directors is superior to 10 years, 0 Otherwise 
7) D7=1 if the majority of the board holds a degree superior to a bachelor, 0 Otherwise 
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In order to construct the governance score for the audit committee, we construct the following dummy 
variables: 
 
1) D1=1 if the audit committee is entirely composed of unrelated directors, 0 Otherwise 
2) D2=1 if there is at least one director in the audit committee who is financially active, 0 
Otherwise 
3) D3=1 if there is at least one director in the audit committee who is financially educated, 0 
Otherwise 
4) D4=1 if there is at least one director in the audit committee who has an accounting background, 
0 Otherwise 
5) D5=1 if the audit committee is composed of at least three members, 0 Otherwise 
6) D6=1 if the audit committee is entirely composed of financially active directors, 0 Otherwise 
7) D7=1 if the audit committee is entirely composed of financially educated directors, 0 Otherwise 
8) D8=1 if the majority of the audit committee holds a degree superior to a bachelor, 0, Otherwise 
9) D9=1 if the average tenure in the audit committee for directors is superior to 10 years, 0 
Otherwise 
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Appendix 3: Formula used to compute the predicted value of risk 
management 
The model is: 
 
*
itit yy =  If 0* >ity  where itiitit uXy εβ ++′=*  
0=ity  Otherwise 
 
Let’s call itiit u εη += . Because iu and itε  are independently normally distributed we can show that 
),0(~ 22 εσση +uit N . This leads to:  
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This leads to: 
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